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Abstract
The theoretical literature on business cycles predicts a positive investment response to productivity
improvements. In this work we question this prediction from theoretical and empirical standpoints. We
rst show that a negative short-term response of investment to a positive technology shock is consistent
with a plausibly parameterized new Keynesian DSGE model in which capital is rm-specic and monetary
policy is not fully accommodative. Employing Bayesian techniques, we then provide evidence that perma-
nent productivity improvements have short-term contractionary e¤ects on investment. Even if this result
emerges in both the rm-specic and rental capital specications, only with the former the estimated av-
erage price duration is in line with microeconometric evidence. In the rm-specic capital model, strategic
complementarity in price setting leads to a degree of price inertia which is higher than that implied by the
frequency at which rms change their prices.
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1 Introduction
The strong and positive covariation between GDP and investment is one of the most uncon-
troversial stylized facts of macroeconomic dynamics. This empirical regularity is consistent
with the RBC view on economic uctuations, and with the predictions of a broader class of
business cycle models pointing at technology shocks as one of the main determinants of the
procyclical investment dynamics. In this paper we show, from a theoretical and empirical
point of view, that even if the sample correlation between productivity and investment is
positive, their conditional correlation is negative.
A recent and vast literature interprets the contractionary e¤ects of productivity improve-
ments as evidence of the fact that technology shocks play only a minor role in business cycle
determination. However, existing contributions have mainly focused on the negative short-
term response of hours to positive technology shocks (Galì, 1999, 2004; Galì and Rabanal,
2004; Francis and Ramey, 2002, 2005), often referred to as "productivity-employment puz-
zle". By contrast, the inverted short-term investment response to supply shocks has not been
throughly addressed in the literature on business cycles. Despite this evidence being often
detectable in the results of inuential empirical analyses, it has been mostly overlooked or
attributed to a drawback in the empirical methodology1.
To the best of our knowledge, one major exception is the empirical analysis provided
by Basu, Fernald and Kimball (BFK, 2006) who show that, once a "puried" measure of
TFP is considered, technology improvements turn out to be contractionary on impact2. In
particular, they nd that the impulse response of labor and investment to a "pure" positive
technology shock is negative, statistically signicant on impact and quite persistent. According
to their analysis, variable inputs utilization and non-constant returns explain most of the pro-
cyclicality of the standard Solow residual, while the correlation between their direct measure
of technology and inputs is negative. The theoretical explanation suggested by BFK focuses
on the role of nominal frictions. Their intuition is that simple sticky price models, di¤erently
from frictionless RBC models, are consistent with the nding of contractionary supply shocks.
However, they do not provide an analytical model to support their theoretical arguments.
Our paper improves on this literature in two respects: rst, by showing that the short-term
response of investment to a positive supply shock is negative, we provide further evidence
that other sources of uctuation have to be considered to explain the positive unconditional
correlation in the data; second, we provide a theoretical explanation of this evidence employing
a formal model, and detail the limitations of BFKs preferred theoretical conclusion.
In the rst part of the analysis we develop a monetary DSGE model in which capital is
rm-specic (Altig et al., 2005; Woodford, 2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2005, 2007), and confront
its predictions with those of a more standard rental capital specication. By simulating these
1 In King et al. (1991) the response of investment to a positive supply shock is negative in the short-term when employing a
six variables structural vector error correction model (top right panel in gure 4 on page 834). Francis and Ramey (2002) nd a
similar result with a ve variables SVAR (bottom left panels in gures 2b and 2c on pages 43-44). Uhlig (2006) obtains a negative
capital response to technology shocks in its discussion of Francis and Ramey (2005)s results, but considers this evidence as
theoretically unreasonable and potentially due to mis-identication of the technology shocks. Giuli and Tancioni (2009) explicitly
address this evidence employing structural vector error correction models.
2BFK obtain their direct measure of TFP by controlling for non-technological e¤ects (variable capacity and e¤ort) in the
computation of the aggregate Solow residual.
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alternative model specications we show that, under rental capital market, the emergence of
the negative investment response to productivity improvements requires either very low degree
of monetary policy accommodation3 and/or a degree of nominal stickiness that is inconsis-
tent with micro-econometric evidence. By contrast, once rm-specic capital is considered,
the reverse investment response to technology shocks emerges even with plausible degrees of
nominal rigidity and of monetary policy accommodation.
The economic rationale for these results is mostly related to the fact that the new Key-
nesian Phillips curve (NKPC) characterizing the rm-specic capital specication is atter
than that emerging under rental capital, resulting in a reduced operation of the price ad-
justment mechanism (Altig et al., 2005; Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007). Following a positive
productivity shock, marginal costs tend to fall, but the presence of strategic complementarity
in price setting implies that the reduction in ination is smaller than in the baseline rental
capital model. This leads to a weaker demand expansion and to a reduced use of inputs in
production.
In the presence of relevant demand contraints, monetary policy design plays a key role. We
assume that monetary authorities adjust the interest rate according to a contemporaneous
Taylor rule targeting trend output instead of the theory-consistent potential output. Even if
unappealing from a normative point of view, this hypothesis is empirically relevant, as shown
by the abundant literature providing evidence that the conduct of monetary policy is not fully
accommodative4.
In the second part of the analysis we provide the empirical evaluation of the rm-specic
and rental capital model specications on US data. To do this, we estimate our NK-DSGE
models employing a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) procedure in the spirit of
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004), Juillard et al. (2008) and Smets andWouters
(2003, 2007). We use unltered data in order to preserve the low frequency information
and to enhance the comparability of results with those obtained employing structural vector
autoregregressions (SVAR) identied with long-run restrictions. Moreover, we assume that
the evolution of productivity is approximated by a nonstationary second-order autoregressive
process5. The choice for such a exible specication of the technology process is motivated
by the need of separating the model-specic dynamics from that potentially originating in a
fairly general specication of the stochastic components. In fact, for a particular specication
of the stochastic process of productivity, even RBC models can be made consistent with
the negative investment response to positive technology shocks, since the dynamic properties
of DSGE models depend on both model design (economics) and the chosen autocorrelation
structure of shocks6.
3BFK justify their conclusion in favor of a sticky-price explanation on the basis of the results of simulation experiments in
which the monetary authority does not accommodate the shock on impact. In fact, their conclusions refer to Kimball (1998),
who assumes a xed money growth commitment, and to Basu (1998), who considers a backward-looking Taylor rule.
4Galì et al. (2003) show that this has been the case in the pre-Volker period. BFK provide evidence that FEDs policy has
been not fully accommodative even in the post-Volker period. Moreover, since a reliable measure of potential output is hardly in
the information set of policy makers, a rule targeting trend output may result welfare-improving with respect to a rule targeting
an incorrect measure of potential output (Orphanides, 2003a, 2003b, 2007).
5The hypothesis that productivity evolves following a nonstationary second order process is less restrictive than the random
walk hypothesis, since it allows both slow adjustment to long-run equilibrium and short-term overshooting. Altig et al., (2005),
Del Negro et al. (2005) and Juillard et al. (2008), adopt an AR(2) process for TFP.
6Lindè (2004) shows that if the positive short-run e¤ect of a technology shock on productivity is lower than its long-run e¤ect,
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Even adopting a prior parameterization for which our extended model does not generate
the negative conditional correlation between productivity and investment, we obtain posterior
estimates that are consistent with this outcome. Posterior impulse responses show that the
supply shock leads to a fall in investment and hours under both rm-specic and rental capital
specications. Our results also show that, while with the former the estimated average price
duration is of nearly three quarters, with the latter the estimated average price duration is
of 10 quarters, an implausibly high value when compared to the available evidence at the
rm-level (Bils and Klenow, 2004). Moreover, from Bayesian model comparison we obtain
strong evidence in favor of the rm-specic capital specication.
According to our estimates, the negative investment response emerges as a result of model-
specic attributes a¤ecting the slope of the NKPC (i.e. the capital share, the degree of price
stickiness and demand elasticity) and of the degree of policy accommodation of the shock,
while the degree of autocorrelation in productivity growth plays no role.
A major advantage of our structural methodological perspective is that it allows us to
support BFKs results through the identication of the theoretical mechanisms that are re-
sponsible for the emergence of the contractionary e¤ects of supply shocks. Moreover, our
empirical results are potentially more challenging with respect to those provided by the lit-
erature on the negative short-term response of hours, since i) we focus on the dynamics of
the most pro-cyclical macro-variable; ii) the critical arguments advanced by the opponents
to the "productivity-employment puzzle", basically addressing SVAR identication problems
and stochastic specication issues7, do not apply to our analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the sticky price/wage model with
rm-specic capital. Section 3 compares the dynamic properties of the rm-specic capital
model with those obtainable under the rental capital market specication. Section 4 provides
the details of the Bayesian MCMC estimate of the model and a discussion of results. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model economy
In this section we provide the basic features of a cash-in-advance sticky price/wage NK-DSGE
model in which capital is rm-specic and a nancial cost channel inuences the monetary
transmission mechanisms. The model economy is populated by maximizing households, rms
and nancial intermediaries and is subject to nonstationary productivity shocks giving rise to
a common stochastic trend in real variables. Since the model displays balanced growth, long-
run stationary ratios among real variables (and between each real variable and productivity)
emerge.
The peculiar theoretical features of the model, with respect to the baseline NK-DSGE
model, are basically three: i) capital accumulation is decided by rms; ii) intermediate sector
then a negative short-term e¤ect on hours and investment can be observed. Rotemberg (2003) suggests an explanation based on
technological di¤usion delays.
7Cooley and Dwyer (1998) and Chari et al. (2005) show that SVAR-based results may be seriously a¤ected by the use of
long-run restrictions in small samples. Cristiano et al. (2004) criticizes the results obtained by Galì (1999) and by the following
literature on the employment puzzle sustaining that it emerges because of the wrong consideration of nonstationary hours. This
critical argument does not apply to the stochastic properties of the investment time series, whose nonstationary behavior is
consistent with the balanced growth hypothesis.
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rms borrow money to pay their wage bill; iii) since productivity shocks are permanent, the
model economy evolves around a stochastic growth path.
2.1 Households
We consider a continuum of households indexed by j 2 [0; 1] that have access to a complete
set of contingent claims8. Each household maximizes the expected present discounted value
of a nonseparable CRRA utility over consumption Ct and leisure (1 Ht)9:
Et
1X
t=0
t
tfCt [(1  tHt (j))]'g1 
1  
where Et is the time t expectation operator,  is the discount factor,  denes the inverse
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ' is the inverse labor supply Frish elasticity. The
terms t and t are preference shocks and are assumed to follow the stationary rst order
autoregressive (AR(1)) processes t = 

t 1e
"t and t = 

t 1e
"t , respectively. The rst shock
can be interpreted as a¤ecting the inter-temporal consumption-savings choice, while the latter
a¤ects labor supply. Aggregate consumption Ct is obtained employing the CES aggregator
Ct =
hR 1
0
Ct (i)
 1
 di
i 
 1
, where  denotes the elasticity of substitution among di¤erentiated
goods i.
From householdscost minimization, the following demand function for each good is ob-
tained:
Cdt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 
Ct (1)
where Pt =
hR 1
0
Pt (i)
1  di
i 1
1 
is the price index.
2.1.1 Consumption and saving decisions
Each household purchases consumption goods by means of cash holdings net of deposits and
labor income. LetMt (j) be the nominal balance held at the beginning of period t by household
j, Wt (j)Ht (j) the nominal labor income and Dt (j) the deposit made at the beginning of
period t. Consumption expenditures are restricted by the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint
PtCt (j) Mt (j) +Wt (j)Ht (j) Dt (j) +PtTt (j), where PtTt (j) is a government lump-sum
net transfer. Household js budget constraint is thus given by:
Mt+1 (j)+Bt+1 (j)+Dt (j) =Mt (j)+Wt (j)Ht (j)+t+R
D
t Dt (j)+RtBt (j)+PtTt (j) PtCt
(2)
8Erceg, et al. (2000) show that this hypothesis is needed to ensure that in equilibrium households are homogeneous with
respect to consumption and asset holdings.
9We assume nonseparable utility to obtain o¤setting income and substitution e¤ects of wage changes on labor supply (King
and Rebelo, 2000). This ensures that the model displays balanced growth.
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where t denotes aggregate lump-sum prots from the ownership of rms and of nancial
intermediaries, Bt (j) denotes government bond holdings and RDt (Rt) is the gross nominal
interest rate on deposits (bonds). Since at the equilibrium the CIA constraint must hold with
equality, households budget constraint resolves to Mt+1 (j) = t + RDt Dt (j) + RtBt (j)  
Bt+1 (j). By eliminating money holdings from (2) we obtain an alternative expression for the
budget constraint:
PtCt = Wt (j)Ht (j) + t 1 +RDt 1Dt 1 (j) Dt (j) +Rt 1Bt 1 (j) Bt (j) (3)
Note that, since deposits and government bonds are risk-free, the deposit rate RDt equals the
nominal interest rate set by the monetary authority Rt, i.e.: RDt = Rt = (1 + rt). From
the rst order condition for the representative household optimization problem we obtain the
Euler equation:
Et
8<:t+1t

Ct+1
Ct
  " 1  t+1Ht+1
(1  tHt)
#'(1 )
Pt
Pt+1
9=; = Ett+1t = R 1t (4)
where t in (4) is the time t Lagrange multiplier, and the optimal labor supply equation
mrst = ' (1  tHt) 1 tCt = W rt , which relates the real wage to the real marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure mrst. The presence of hours in the Euler
equation is due to the hypothesis of nonseparable consumption and labor supply choices.
2.1.2 Labor supply and wage determination
We assume that labor unions di¤erentiate homogeneous labor services supplied by households
and o¤er these services indexed by l 2 [0; 1] to intermediate labor packers. Intermediate sector
rms employ a composite labor input Ht aggregated by packers (Smets and Wouters, 2007)
according to the CES aggregator Ht =
hR 1
0
Ht (l)
1 H dl
i 1
1 H , where H denotes the elasticity
of substitution in the composite labor input. Labor unions are thus monopolistically com-
petitive suppliers of di¤erentiated labor services Ht (l), while packers operate in a perfectly
competitive environment. The hypothesis that labor services are homogeneous at the house-
hold level guarantees that the labour supply decision is the same for all households. This
ensures homogeneity of consumption across households even under non-separable preferences.
Packersrst order condition for prot maximization leads to:
Hdt (l) =

Wt (l)
Wt
 H
Hdt (5)
whereWt =
hR 1
0
Wt (l)
1 H dl
i 1
1 H is the wage index andWt (l) is the nominal wage for type-l
labor.
The monopolistically competitive labor suppliers set the wage in staggered contracts. Each
period only a randomly drawn fraction (1  w) can reset the wage, while the fraction w
adjusts the wage mechanically according to long-run productivity growth and to a weighted
average (with weights w and 1  w) of last periods ination and of steady state ination:
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Wt (l) = 
w
p;t 1
(1 w)
p zWt 1 (l) (6)
where z denotes the deterministic component in the technology growth process Zt, p is steady
state ination and p;t 1 = Pt 1=Pt 2 is last periods ination. Under wage indexation, the
relevant labor demand constraint (5) resolves to:
Hdt+k (l) =

Wt (l) t;k
Wt+k
 H
Hdt+k (7)
where wt;k = 1 for k = 0 and 
w
t;k =
Qk
f=1 
w
p;t+f 1
(1 w)
p z for k > 0.
The wage mark-up stemming from monopoly power is distributed to households. Their
utility is maximized when unions maximize the di¤erence between the newly set wage Wt (l)
and the marginal rate of substitution, subject to the type-l labor demand schedule (7). The
maximization problem thus takes the form:
max
W t (l)
1X
k=0
(w)
k Et

t+k
t
Pt+k
Pt
Hdt+k (l)

wt;kWt (l)
Pt+k
 mrst+k

(8)
resulting in the following rst order condition:
1X
k=0
(w)
k Et

t+k
t
Pt+k
Pt
Hdt+k (l)

wt;kW

t (l)
Pt+k
  H
H   1mrst+k

= 0 (9)
Finally, considering the Calvo-scheme and the wage indexation rule, the aggregate wage
equation is obtained:
Wt =
n
(1  w)W (H 1)t + w

wp;t 1
(1 w)
p zWt 1
(H 1)o 1H 1 (10)
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 The competitive nal goods sector
Each period t a homogeneous nal consumption good is produced by rms operating in a
perfectly competitive environment. Production requires only intermediate (di¤erentiated)
commodities Yt (i) indexed by i 2 [0; 1], that are combined employing the CES technology
Yt =
hR
(Yt (i))
 1
 di
i 
 1
.
Each nal sector rm takes input prices as given and maximizes its prots t = PtYt  Z
Pt (i)Yt (i) di considering the nal goods production technology. The rst order condition
and the free-entry assumption lead to the following demand schedule for intermediate goods:
Y dt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 
Y dt (11)
where Y dt is aggregate demand.
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2.2.2 The intermediate goods sector
Each period t a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms indexed on the unit interval
maximizes the present value of their future dividend stream by combining the owned capital
stock Kt 1 (i) with hired labor services Ht (i) in a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt (i) = Kt 1 (i)
 (ZtHt (i))
1  (12)
where Zt is a stochastic process dening the evolution of the labor-augmenting technology
level. We assume a fairly general specication for Zt, i.e. a trending nonstationary AR(2)
process Zt = Zt 1z;t, where z;t = 
(1 z)
z 
z
z;t 1e
"zt , z denes the deterministic trend compo-
nent (the constant growth rate) and "zt is the i.i.d. technology shock
10.
Each rm i rents labor services from the households and makes an investment decision
at any point in time. We assume that the rm borrows funds Wt (i)Ht (i) at the nominal
interest rate RLt = 1 + r
L
t from the nancial intermediary to pay its wage bill and pays back
RLtWt (i)Ht (i) at the end of the period. The rm changes its price according to a random
duration Calvo scheme.
Firm-owned capital becomes productive with one period lag, is subject to convex capital
adjustment costs and evolves according to the following law of motion:
It (i) = tI

Kt (i)
Kt 1 (i)

Kt 1 (i) (13)
The investment function I (:) is increasing and convex, with steady state value I (1) =  +
z   1 and derivatives I 0 (1) = 1 and I 00 (1) =  . The parameter  is the rate of capital
depreciation,  > 0 denotes the degree of capital adjustment costs and t is a shock to the
capital adjustment cost function, which is assumed to follow the stationary AR(1) process
t = 

t 1e
"t .
Given the capital stock inherited from the previous period Kt 1 (i), each rm i chooses a
time contingent plan for fHt+k (i) ; Kt+k (i)g1k=0 and reoptimizes its price Pt+k (i) with a con-
stant probability (1  p), while with probability p it adjusts its price mechanically according
to a weighted average (with weights p and 1  p) of last period and steady state ination:
Pt (j) = 
p
p;t 1
(1 p)
p Pt 1 (j) (14)
Taking into account the dynamic indexation equation (14) and the Calvo-scheme, the prot
maximization problem can be written as follows:
Max
Ht+k(i); Kt+k(i); P

t+k(i)
t;h =
1X
k=0
kEt

t+k
t
h
Yt+k (i)
d Pt+k (i) RLt+kWt+k (i)Ht+k (i)  Pt+kIt+k (i)
i
s.t. Pt+k+1 (i) =
(
P t+k+1 (i) with probability (1  p)
Pt+k+1 (i) = 
p
p;t+k
(1 p)
p Pt+k (i) with probability p
)
,
and (11), (12), (13).
10This specication implies the pure random walk and the random walk with drift processes as special cases, for [z = 1; z = 0]
and z = 0, respectively.
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By solving the problem with respect to P t+k (i), the usual price setting equation is obtained:
1X
k=0
(p)
k Et

t+k
t
Yt+k (i)

P t (i) 
P
t;k  

  1MCt+k (i)

= 0 (15)
where Pt;k = 1 for k = 0 and 
P
t;k =
Qk
f=1 
p
p;t+f 1
(1 p)
p for k > 0. The term MCt (i)
denotes the marginal cost MCt (i) =
RLt Wt(i)
(1 )

Kt 1(i)
ZtHt(i)
 .
This equation establishes that rms set their prices according to a mark-up over their
expected marginal cost, taking into account the forward probabilities of not being allowed to
change price again. The Calvo-scheme implies the following aggregate price equation:
Pt =
n
(1  p)P ( 1)t + p


p
p;t 1
(1 p)
p Pt 1
( 1)o 1 1
(16)
By solving the maximization problem with respect to Kt+k (i), the following rst order
condition for capital accumulation is obtained:
t
dIt (i)
dKt (i)
Pt = Et

t+1
t

MSt+1 (i)  t+1
dIt+1 (i)
dKt (i)
Pt+1

= 0 (17)
whereMSt (i) = RLtWt

(1 )
ZtHt(i)
Kt 1(i)
is the marginal return of the rm-specic capital expressed
in terms of marginal savings in labor costs.
Firm-specicity is evident in the fact that the marginal saving and the marginal cost
are rm-specic. An important implication of the rm-specic capital hypothesis is that
reoptimizing rms choose di¤erent prices, since their marginal costs are a¤ected by past
decisions on accumulation and price setting (Woodford, 2005).
The optimal investment equation under rental capital market can be obtained by replacing
the rm-specic marginal saving MSt (i) in (17) with the expression for marginal returns to
capital, that are common to all rms (Sveen and Weinke, 2005). We shall return on the
di¤erent implications of the rm-specic and rental capital assumptions when analyzing the
dynamic properties of the models in Section 3.
2.3 Financial intermediaries and interest rate spread
Each period t a continuum of perfectly competitive nancial intermediaries indexed on the
unit interval receives deposits Dt from the households and supply loans Lt to rms at the
nominal interest rate RLt for anticipated wage payments WtHt. At the end of each period the
credit sector pays back the interest-augmented initial deposit RDt Dt and ownership prots to
households. Each nancial intermediary maximize its prot function ^FIt = R
L
t L^t   RDt D^t,
subject to the credit demand constraint Lt = FtDt, where Ft = F0

RLt
(RLt 1)

rL

,   0, is
an intermediation cost function, which depends on changes in the lending rate. The demand
constraint denes the amount of loans that the nancial intermediary can create from a given
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amount of deposits Dt. By log-linearizing the rst order condition for prot maximization a
relation between the interest rate on loans and the risk-free (deposit) interest rate is obtained11:
rLt =
1
1 + 
rDt + rL

1 + 
rLt 1 + logt (18)
where the size of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient rL denes the degree of smoothness in lending
rate adjustments and log is the log-linear representation of a stochastic disturbance term,
which is assumed to be white noise around a non zero constant term, i.e. t = rLe
"t . The
deterministic component rL captures the non zero mean interest rate spread found in the
data. When  = 0 the interest rate on loans equals the risk-free (deposit) rate. In such a case,
the economic interpretation of the nancial sector is straightforward and fully equivalent to
that provided in the analyses of Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
The emergence of a nancial cost channel in the monetary policy transmission mechanism
implies that, since monetary authorities (partly) accommodate the supply shock by reducing
the interest rate, labor hire may become cheaper than capital self-nancing. This, other things
being equal, can stimulate less capital-intensive production technologies.
2.4 Public sector and market equilibrium conditions
Monetary authorities are assumed to set the nominal interest rate Rt  1 + rt according to a
contemporaneous rule satisfying the Taylor principle for stability. The empirical rule considers
the ination deviation from a non zero-mean policy target p and the output growth deviation
from the deterministic rate of growth z. The policy instrument is adjusted gradually, giving
rise to interest rate smoothing:
Rt = R
r
t 1
"
Rrp

p;t
p
#1 r Yt=Yt 1
z
y
t (19)
where Rr = 1= z and r denes the degree of interest rate smoothing. Note that the
constant policy target p determines steady state ination. The stochastic term t denotes
the monetary policy shock, which is assumed follow the AR(1) process t = 

t e
"t .
Like money-growth rules, the implementation of such a policy rule does not require the
knowledge of the natural rate of interest or of the level of potential output (both unobserved).
The hypothesis that the central bank targets trend output instead of the output that would
have prevailed in the absence of nominal rigidities has been adopted in the empirical DSGE
literature (e.g. Adolfson et al., 2007) and turns out consistent with the main objective of
our analysis, which is basically empirical12. We will further discuss the justications and
implications of the chosen policy rule when discussing model dynamics in Section 3.
11A recent literature suggests several ways of modelling the credit sector (see e.g, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Christiano et
al. 2005; Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). However, the derivation of a specic microfoundation of banksbehavior is out of
the scope of our analysis, which only requires the representation of a nancial cost channel with interest rate smoothing. For this
reason we follow the simple approach provided by Kaufmann and Scharler (2009).
12Note that there is no consensus about the appropriate output gap measure under rm-specic capital. When capital is
endogenous, at least two alternative concepts of potential output emerge: the rst is dened with respect to the level of output
that would prevail if current and future prices were exible (Woodford, 2005); the second is dened by taking into account the
potential output that would have been obtained if prices had also been exible in the past (Neiss and Nelson, 2003).
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The scal authority levies lump-sum taxes and provides lump-sum transfers to households
ensuring public sector solvency, i.e., ensuring that lim
k!1
= (Bt+k +Mt+k)
kQ
h=1
(1 + rt+h)
 1 = 0.
The additional assumption of zero net government bond supply holds. Under these assump-
tions, non Ricardian scal policy e¤ects are ruled out. The budget constraint for the public
sector is thus given by Mt+1 Mt+Bt+1 RtBt+Gt = PtTt, where Gt denotes public expen-
diture. Labor and goods market equilibrium is satised when demand equals supply for each
variety of labor j and of commodities i. By plugging net government transfers and house-
holdsownership prots in the households budget constraint and integrating across household,
equilibrium in all markets implies:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (20)
where It =
R
It (i) di is aggregate investment. The term It (i) denotes rm is demand of the
composite investment good, which is aggregated in the same proportion of the consumption
index. Moreover, by dening aggregate capital for all t as Kt =
Z
Kt (i) di and the auxiliary
variable Yt = (ZtHt)
1 Kt , it is easy to verify that the di¤erence between Yt and Yt is of
second order and thus it can be ignored in the log-linear approximation.
2.5 The (stationary) linearized model and the NK Phillips Curve
Since the nonstationary technology process induces a stochastic trend in real variables, before
log-linearizing the model we have to express it in terms of detrended variables, i.e. we have
to derive the stationary representation of the model. Stationarity is obtained by imposing the
following transformations:
Yt = Y^tZt, Ct = C^tZt, It = I^tZt, Kt = K^tZt,
Wt
Pt
= W^ rt Zt
where the "hat" superscript indicates that level variables are expressed in terms of stationary
ratios13.
The scaled model is then log-linearized around the steady state, taking into account that
the presence of a deterministic term in the productivity growth process (the steady state
balanced growth term z) a¤ects the coe¢ cients of the dynamic equations.
The economic system is composed of four equations obtained by log-linearizing the rst
order conditions (4), (17), (15) taking into account (16), and (9) taking into account (??),
and of ve equations obtained by log-linearizing (12), (13), (19) and (20) and by considering
the interest rate pass-through equation (18). Finally, other 9 equations are obtained by log-
linearizing the stochastic processes that drive model dynamics. Leaving out the stochastic
processes, the complete system of log-linear equations in stationary form is the following:
13A detailed analytical derivation of the stationary model is provided in the technical appendix, available upon request from
the authors.
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  log () +  log 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  t   log p+ (22.7)
+ y (yt   log z) + log t
y^t = (1  I   G) c^t + I {^t + G log umet (22.8)
rLt =
1
1 + 
rt + rL

1 + 
rLt 1 + logt (22.9)
where lower-case letters denote log-deviations from the steady-state. For a comparison with
the nonlinear specication of the model, consider that  = logRr, t = log p;t, ^w;t = w^
r
t  
w^rt 1 and yt = y^t+log z;t. The coe¢ cient I =
(+z 1)

 1z(+)
is the steady state investment to
output ratio, while G is the steady state government expenditure to output ratio. The term
log umet is an AR(1) measurement error capturing the evolution of public expenditure and other
exogenous components a¤ecting the aggregate resource constraint. To account for the relevant
changes in US net exports, we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and assume that exogenous
expenditure is also a¤ected by the technology shock, i.e. log umet = me log u
me
t 1+"
me
t +z;me"
z
t .
The terms log ut and log u
w
t are AR(1) measurement error processes (log u

t =  log u

t 1+"

t ,
log uwt = w log u
w
t 1 + "
w
t ), which are imposed to overcome the stochastic singularity of the
model at the estimation stage14. The choice of allowing for serially correlated errors has
two potential advantages: rst, it should enhance the ability of the model of tracking the
autocorrelated structure of the data; second, it should allow us to disentangle the role of the
14The empirical literature often suggests an interpretation in terms of cost-push shocks or in terms of disturbances a¤ecting
the mark-up in labor and goods markets.
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economic model from that of the stochastic components in addressing the persistence in the
data (Ireland, 2004).
The coe¢ cient  determines the slope of the NKPC. Its computation is not straightforward
and can only be obtained with the method of undetermined coe¢ cients15. However, since the
convolution of structural parameters  = (1 p)(1 p)
p
1 
1 + provides a satisfying approxima-
tion of the NKPC slope coe¢ cient under rm-specic capital (Sveen and Weinke, 2004; 2005),
we will adopt this formulation at the estimation stage. This choice allows the estimation of the
NKPC slope coe¢ cient in its structural form expression, enhancing parameters identication
and the economic interpretability of results.
2.6 Firm-specic v. rental capital market: main implications
The sole di¤erence between the log-linear representation of the rm-specic and rental capital
models concerns the slope of the NKPC. Under rental capital hypothesis, the NKPC slope
coe¢ cient has a standard expression in terms of the Calvo-parameter p and of the discount
factor 1 z , i.e.  =
(1 1 z p)(1 p)
p
. Considering Sveen and Weinkes (2004, 2005) approx-
imation, the only di¤erence characterizing the rm-specic capital model NKPC from that
implied by the rental capital model is the presence of the multiplicative term 1 
1 + . Note
that this term reduces the slope of the curve for any plausible parameterization of the model.
This apparently minor di¤erence provides a key distinction in terms of model properties, as it
implies a atter NKPC resulting in a reduced price sensitivity to changes in the marginal cost.
This implies that, other things being equal, the rm-specic capital model is characterized
by a slower operation of the price adjustment mechanism. Table 1 below, for  = 0:998,
z = 1:005 and  = 2, provides an appreciation of such a reduction, as captured by the size
of the reduced-form NKPC slope coe¢ cient resulting from di¤erent degrees of nominal stick-
iness (dened by the Calvo parameter p) and of demand elasticity . The last row of Table
1 provides the NKPC slope coe¢ cient implied by di¤erent values of p in the rental capital
(RK) model.
Table 1 - The NKPC slope coe¢ cient
p
 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
6 0:207 0:115 0:062 0:030 0:012 0:003
11 0:126 0:070 0:037 0:018 0:007 0:002
21 0:071 0:039 0:021 0:010 0:004 0:001
41 0:038 0:021 0:011 0:005 0:002 0:000
RK 0:904 0:503 0:269 0:131 0:051 0:012
Note: p: degree of nominal rigidity; : demand elasticity parameter
The ination response is decreasing in the elasticity parameter  because rms marginal
costs depend on the level of output (since capital is predetermined), which in turn depends
on the demand elasticity to price changes. This implies that, when making their pricing
15A description of the procedure to derive  with the method of undetermined coe¢ cients can be found in Altig et al. (2004)
and Christiano (2004) in a simpler model.
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decisions, rms face a trade-o¤ between the expected e¤ects on demand and the expected
e¤ects on marginal costs, with the latter moving in the opposite direction of the price change.
The higher the elasticity of demand (i.e. the lower the degree of monopolistic competition in
the economy), the lower the incentive to change prices.
3 Supply shocks and investment dynamics
In this section we provide an evaluation of the investment dynamics implied by the theoretical
model, based on the short-term impulse response of investment to a positive technology shock.
The analysis focuses on the relevance of the size of the NKPC slope coe¢ cient and of the degree
of monetary policy accommodation (dened by the Taylor rule parameters  and y) for the
conditional investment dynamics, in both the rm-specic and rental capital specications.
We assume complete dynamic indexation (i.e. p = w = 1), a degree of nominal wage
stickiness w = 0:5 and x to zero the nancial intermediation cost parameter , i.e. we
assume that there are no nancial market imperfections, such that the interest rate on loans
equals the risk-free deposit rate. In order to isolate the model-specic dynamics from that
potentially arising from the AR(2) specication of the process characterizing the evolution of
the technology level Zt, we assume no autocorrelation in growth rates, that is z = 0. For the
remaining parameters we employ a standard calibration, which mirrors the priors adopted for
the Bayesian estimation of the model, whose details and results will be discussed in section 4
(see Table 2).
3.1 Nominal rigidities, strategic complementarity and the inverted investment
response
Figure 1 reports the four-quarters average investment response (vertical scale) to a one per-
cent standard deviation supply shock, for di¤erent degrees of price stickiness (left horizontal
scale) and of demand elasticity (right horizontal scale). The simulation considers a standard
parameterization for the monetary policy reaction rule, i.e.  = 1:5 and y = 0:2.
The negative short-term investment response may emerge under both model specications.
However, under rental capital market it is only observed for a very high degree of price rigidity
(i.e. for values above 0:85). In this case the role played by the demand elasticity parameter
 is negligible, since it does not a¤ect the NKPC slope coe¢ cient. This result provides a
rst indication that BFKs conclusion that standard NK monetary models can account for
the contractionary e¤ects of supply shocks is not fully legitimate, since the required degree
of nominal rigidity is inconsistent with the available econometric evidence on average price
duration16. By contrast, under rm-specic capital the reverse investment response to supply
shocks emerges for degrees of price rigidity that are consistent with rm-level evidence of price
reoptimization, and for reasonable values of the demand elasticity parameter. The degree of
price rigidity which is needed to observe the inverted investment response is decreasing in
16The average price duration implied by Calvo parameter values higher than 0.85 is above 6.6 quarters. Even if a number of
macroeconometric studies on U.S. data report an high average duration of price xity (Galì and Gertler, 1999 and Eichenbaum
and Fisher, 2004 obtain average durations of nearly six quarters), results from microeconometric studies indicate lower degrees
of price rigidity. Bils and Klenow (2004) analyze rm-level data and report an average price duration of roughly two quarters.
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the demand elasticity parameter: when  = 11, a value consistent with a 10% mark-up, the
threshold p is approximately 0:6. When  = 21 (consistent with a 5% mark-up), the reverse
investment response emerges even with a Calvo parameter value of 0:52, which implies a price
duration of roughly two quarters.
Figure 1 - Average four quarters investment response to a technology shock:
for di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidity and demand elasticity
a : Firm-specic capital model b : Rental capital model
Note: the parameter p denes the degree of nominal rigidity; the parameter  denotes demand elasticity
The key point is thus the atter NKPC emerging under rm-specic capital hypothesis.
With this assumption at work, rmsmarginal costs are increasing with their own output,
which in turn depends on demand elasticity. This implies that reoptimizing rms facing
a positive supply shock are induced to cut their prices by a smaller amount than in the
rental capital model, since they anticipate that price reductions eventually lead to higher
marginal costs due to increased demand and output. This leads to a weaker demand response
that constrains the use of inputs in production. The incentive for a price reduction implied
by a productivity improvement is decreasing in the degree of elasticity of demand. The
elasticity parameter  thus denes the degree of strategic complementarity a¤ecting rms
pricing behavior.
It is worth mentioning that, according to our calibrations, the supply shock is still expan-
sionary for consumption and output, even when it induces a negative short-term response
of hours and investment. This is due to the wealth e¤ect of the permanent improvement in
productivity. Moreover, by specifying the technology process such that the impact e¤ect of a
positive technology shock on productivity is lower than its long-run e¤ect - i.e. by xing the
coe¢ cient z above zero - we obtain even stronger short-term reductions in the use of inputs,
since they are expected to become more productive in the future, when the technology level
reaches its long-run potential17.
3.2 The role of the degree of monetary policy accommodation
Figure 2 shows the four-quarters average investment response (vertical scale) to a one percent
standard deviation shock, for di¤erent degrees of monetary policy accommodation, as dened
17This is basically the reason behind the result that news about future TFP may result contractionary even assuming a
frictionless model economy (Danthine et al., 1998; Beaudry and Portier, 2007).
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by the Taylor rule coe¢ cients  and y. We consider an average price duration of two
quarters (p = 0:5), an average price mark-up of 5% (i.e.  = 21) and a degree of interest rate
smoothness r = 0:6.
The main result is that the negative investment response is not observed under rental
capital while under rm-specic capital it emerges even considering reasonable degrees of
policy activism. With  = 1:5, the inverted short-term investment response emerges when
the policy response to output growth (i.e. y) is above 0:25. The threshold value for y
increases with the degree of policy activism with respect to ination and is decreasing in the
degree of interest rate smoothness.
Since we have ruled out the e¤ects of expected increases in the productivity level (i.e.
z = 0), the fundamental factor explaining the investment dynamics is the weak demand
response. Central banks behavior thus plays a key role: when a technology shock hits the
economy, the degree to which real activity follows its natural level depends on nominal interest
and price adjustments, jointly determining the real interest rate. We have seen that under
rm-specic capital the incentive to cut prices perceived by the rm is countervailed by the
expectation for higher marginal costs, which are increasing in demand and output. Other
things being equal, the emergence of this trade-o¤ implies that a given Taylor rule is less
accommodative in the rm-specic capital model than in the rental capital model.
Figure 2 - Investment response to a technology shock:
for di¤erent values of the policy rule coe¢ cients
a : Firm-specic capital model b : Rental capital model
Note: : MP response to ination deviations from the policy target; dy MP response to output deviations from trend growth
We are aware of the fact that a policy rule targeting potential output would make the
negative investment response less likely, while a policy rule targeting the long-term growth
rate implies that authorities might underestimate the actual growth rate of natural output,
resulting in a not fully accommodative interest rate response. However, there are at least
three reasons justifying our choice for an empirical rule: rst, since our interest is mainly
empirical, the chosen policy rule should be consistent with both the standard and the inverted
investment response for a reasonable parameterization of the model. Second, a rule targeting
the theory-based output gap requires perfect knowledge of the natural level of output, which
is - by denition - unobservable. In other terms, we have to consider how policy makers - in
real life operations - form their opinions about the natural level of output, which is hardly
in monetary authoritiesinformation set. For this reason, an output gap targeting can result
16
inferior to one responding to output deviations from trend (Orphanides, 2003a, 2003b, 2007;
Del Negro et al., 2005)18. Third, since in our model the "divine coincidence" result does not
hold19, the interest rate response to the technology shock implies a relevant trade-o¤ between
ination and output stabilization. This implies that the denition of the policy rule is not
straightforward even on purely theoretical grounds.
4 Bayesian estimation, model comparison and simulation
This section provides some details of the strategy adopted to estimate the structural para-
meters of the monetary DSGE model presented in the previous sections. For the purpose of
model comparison, we estimate both the rm-specic and the rental capital versions of the
model.
The estimation of DSGE models is a cumbersome task, since in general there are relevant
nonlinearities in model parameters that may a¤ect the performances of the Full Information
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator. Even if a viable solution would be to restrict the
parameters space by xing the values of certain parameters, or by forcing them within a
reasonablerange (i.e. to employ a constrained FIML estimator), in our analysis we employ
a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) estimator. In both approaches, the nal
estimates depend on prior assumptions on the range of admissible values, with the di¤erence
that distributional priors are specied with the Bayesian approach20.
4.1 The posterior distribution
The scope of the Bayesian estimator is to get the posterior distribution for the structural
parameters conditioning on prior beliefs on models Mj (j = 1; 2; :::), structural parameters
j, and sample information. The methodology thus nests the formalized prior distribution
P (j;Mj) for j-th models parameters vector j and the conditional distribution (pseudo-
likelihood) P (YT j j;Mj) to get the posterior density P (jj YT ;Mj), where YT = fytgTt=1
contains sample information. This is obtained by employing the Bayes rule:
P (jj YT ;Mj) =
P (YT j j;Mj)P (j;Mj)
P (YT ;Mj)
(22)
where P (YT ;Mj) is the marginal data density, that can be normalized since it does not
depend on j.
The posterior distribution is the result of a weighted average of prior and conditional
distributions, where weights are inversely related to the variance of the prior distributions and
of sample information, respectively21.
18Real-time data on potential output are subject to relevant imperfections, as testied by the their frequent and substantial
revisions. Moreover, under model uncertainty and when technology evolves according to a random walk with drift process, the
estimated long-term deterministic growth component z might represent the best prediction for output growth.
19The divine coincidence addresses the equivalence in stabilizing ination and the welfare-relevant output gap (see Blanchard
and Galì, 2007).
20 The Bayesian technique can in fact be considered equivalent to constrained Maximum Likelihood from a Bayesian perspective,
i.e. one in which restrictions (priors) are dened in terms of probability distributions.
21Formalizing a tight prior will result in a highly constrained estimation, while a di¤use prior will result in a weakly constrained
17
The posterior density of interest is a complex nonlinear function of the deep parameters j,
thus its analytical calculation is not generally feasible. For this reason, the Bayesian MCMC
posterior estimates are obtained employing a two-steps procedure: the Kalman smoother
provides the approximation of the conditional distribution and the Metropolis-Hastings (M-
H) algorithm performs Monte Carlo integration22.
The empirical performances of the rm-specic and rental capital models (FSK and RK,
respectively) are then compared employing the Bayes factor (BFFSK;RK), i.e. the ratio be-
tween marginal likelihoods P (YT jMFSK)
P (YT jMRK) - times the model priors ratio
P (MFSK)
P (MRK)
23. To calculate
the marginal likelihoods we employ the Laplace approximation. We will adopt Je¤reys (1961)
scale of evidence to derive our conclusions on the preferred specication.
4.2 Data and prior distributions
4.2.1 Data
For the Bayesian estimation of our model and its comparison with the rental capital version we
employ unprocessed quarterly time series for the sample period 1954:3 - 2007:3. Eight variables
are considered: (log di¤erences of) real GDP (yt), real consumption (ct), real investment
(it), real wage (wt), (log levels of) hours (ht), GDP price ination (t) the federal funds
rate (rt) and the prime loan rate
 
rLt

. Data for real variables and the GDP price deator are
obtained from the BEA database, while data employed to construct the labor supply measure
are obtained from the BLS database24. The nominal interest rates are obtained from the
FRED database. The vector of observables x0t =

yt ct it wt ht t rt r
L
t

is
thus employed.
4.2.2 Prior distributions
Both the rm-specic and the rental capital specications are characterized by a 39-dimensional
parameters vector
 
0FSK;RK

. Note that 19 of these parameters pertain to the stochastic struc-
ture of the model, since 18 dene the standard errors and the persistence of shocks and one the
cross-correlation between the aggregate resources constraint disturbance and the technology
shock.
estimation. Asymptotically, the conditional distribution dominates the prior distribution and the posterior distribution of the
parameters collapses to their pseudo-true values. This property guarantees that the relevance of priors in posterior estimates
vanishes as the sample size increases. A further feature of the Bayesian estimator that is particularly important in standard
applications is that its small sample performances outperform those of the FIML estimator (Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramirez, 2004).
22The posterior mode is estimated employing the Sims optimizer, while numerical integration is performed employing ve
parallel chains of 250000 M-H replications each. The fraction of drops of the initial parameters vector estimates is set at 30%.
The scale parameter for the variance of the jumping distribution is calibrated such that we obtain an acceptance rate of nearly
25% in the ve blocks. This value guarantees that the M-H algorithm explores the entire support of the posterior distributions.
For the application of the Bayesian method we employ the open-source software Dynare 4.02 for Matlab.
23Since we dont have prior model preferences, we assume that the rm-specic and the rental capital models have the same
probability, i.e. P (MFSK) = P (MRK), thus the Bayes factor is equivalent to the posterior odds ratio.
24Labor supply is calculated as the log ratio between non farm total hours worked and the population aged over 16. The use
of the hours to population ratio as the labor supply measure is standard in the literature (Galì and Rabanal, 2004; Chari et al.,
2005; Del Negro et al., 2005). A more detailed description of data and data manipulations is provided in the technical appendix,
available upon request from the authors.
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We impose one dogmatic prior only by xing the discount factor  to 0:998. The high
value of  is chosen to enhance a data-consistent estimate of the long-run growth parameter
z and of the steady-state ination parameter p, given a reasonable prior parameterization
for consumption curvature 25. All the remaining parameters are estimated.
The shape of the prior distributions is chosen according to the following standard practice:
the reference distribution for the structural shocks is the inverted gamma, which is dened
over the R+ range; for parameters theoretically dened in a [0  1] interval a beta distribution
is assumed, while the normal distribution is adopted for priors on parameters theoretically
dened over the R range. Concerning prior variability, a tight prior is chosen when information
on parameter values can be derived by sample data, as in the case of steady state values and
long run ratios. This strategy has the potential advantage of enhancing the identication of
other structural parameters, when these are not variation-free with respect to the former set.
For the parameters dening the steady state value of productivity growth (z), ination 
p

and of the interest rate spread (rL) we adopt an informative prior dened by a normal
distribution centered on the respective sample means (1:0045, 1:0088 and 1:005), with stan-
dard deviations equal to 0:001. Concerning the the steady state labor supply and exogenous
expenditure (government) shares H and G, we adopt a beta-distributed prior with means
1=3 and 1=5 and standard deviations 0:05 and 0:025. An informative beta-distributed prior is
also adopted for  and , whose prior means (standard deviations) are set to 0:36 and 0:025
(0:015 and 0:002), respectively. The chosen mean values of this rst set of parameters are
consistent with average gures from sample data.
The prior distributions for the consumption curvature and the inverse labor supply Frish
elasticity parameters are assumed to be normal and centered around  = 2 and ' = 0:5, with
standard deviations equal to 0:2 and 0:1, respectively. The prior for the parameter dening the
convex capital adjustment cost  follows a normal distribution with prior mean 3 (Woodford,
2005) and standard deviation 0:2.
Concerning the Calvo parameters p and w, we adopt a beta-distributed prior with mean
0:5 and a prior standard deviation 0:1. These values are in line with the microeconometric
evidence produced by Bils and Klenow (2004), suggesting an average price duration of two
quarters, even if they are smaller than those generally obtained at the macro level, that
indicate an average price duration above six quarters (Galì and Gertler, 1999; Eichenbaum
and Fisher, 2007; Del Negro et al., 2005).
A further key parameter a¤ecting the slope of the NKPC under rm-specic capital hypoth-
esis is the elasticity of substitution among di¤erentiated goods . The standard practice has
been that of employing values implied by a dogmatic prior on the price mark-up  (  1) 1 1.
Unfortunately, a wide range of values is found in the literature, since the hypothesized mark-
up ranges from 20% (Smets and Wouters, 2003) to 1% (Altig et al., 2005). For this reason,
and given its importance for model dynamics, we adopt a very di¤use prior for , assuming a
normal distribution with prior mean 21 (consistent with a 5% mark-up) and prior standard
deviation 10.
Concerning the indexation parameters p and w, we adopt a beta-distributed prior with
25Our sample data indicate that quarterly output growth has been, on average, nearly 0.45%, while quarterly ination and
nominal interest rates have been 0.88% and 1.42%, respectively.
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mean 0:75 and standard deviation 0:1. The chosen prior mean is higher than the values ob-
tained by Smets and Wouters (2007), who initialize the estimation over a lower prior support
centered on a mean equal to 0:5. This choice allows us to minimize the degree of autocorre-
lation in ination explained by the stochastic components
The coe¢ cients of the monetary policy reaction rule are assumed to follow a normal dis-
tribution centered on prior mean values  = 1:5 and y = 0:2, with standard deviations
equal to 0:1 and 0:05, respectively. The autoregressive coe¢ cient r dening the degree of
interest rate smoothness is beta-distributed with prior mean 0:6 and prior standard deviation
0:1. Concerning the parameters a¤ecting the interest rate pass-through  and rL , we assume
a normal distribution with prior mean (standard deviation) 0:1 (0:05) and a beta distribution
with prior mean (standard deviation) 0:5 (0:1), respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that, given the prior parameterization, the estimates are initial-
ized over a parameter space for which the model does not replicate the negative conditional
correlation between productivity and investment.
Concerning the stochastic components, we adopt a normal distribution with zero prior
mean z = 0 and a standard deviation of 0:2 for the coe¢ cient dening the autocorrelation in
log-di¤erences of Zt, i.e. we adopt a random walk with drift prior For the autoregressive coe¢ -
cients of the shocks a¤ecting the capital adjustment cost and the aggregate resources constraint
( , me, respectively) we assume a beta distribution with prior mean 0:75 and standard devi-
ation 0:1, while a prior mean value 0:5 is assumed for the cross-correlation parameter z;me. A
beta-distributed prior with mean 0:5 and standard deviation 0:1 is adopted for the autoregres-
sive coe¢ cients of the shocks to the discount factor and labor supply
 
, , respectively

.
The degree of autocorrelation of the monetary policy shock t is assumed to follow a beta
distribution with prior mean of 0:25 and standard deviation 0:1. Finally, for the autoregressive
coe¢ cients, , and w , we assume a beta-distributed prior with mean 0:15 and standard de-
viation 0:05. The choice for such a low degree of autocorrelation for the price and wage-push
measurement errors should enhance the identication of the economic sources of persistence,
since it forces the autocorrelation in the data to be captured by the size of the structural
parameters. The estimated Calvo parameters are in fact particularly sensitive to the prior
degree of persistence of the stochastic components26.
For the standard errors of innovations we assume a prior mean of 0:01 with two degrees
of freedom when entering stationary stochastic processes. We instead assume an innite
standard deviation for the shock driving the nonstationary AR(2) process. These di¤use
priors on perturbations reect a very imprecise opinion about the dimensionality of shocks.
All these prior opinions on structural parameters are summarized in the rst three columns
of Table 2.
4.3 Estimation results
Table 2 reports the posterior mode and mean parameter estimates for the rm-specic and
the rental capital specications (FSK and RK , respectively). Panel a contains the results
26Smets and Wouters (2007), by assuming a higher prior value for the autoregressive coe¢ cients (0:5), estimate a very high
degree of stochastic persistence for price and wage dynamics (nearly 0:9). This reduces the size of the estimated Calvo parameters,
i.e. the degree of persistence explained by economic relations.
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for the estimated parameters dening the model structure, while panel b the estimates of the
parameters dening the persistence and size of the stochastic components27.
Table 2a - Priors and posterior distribution of structural parameters
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
FSK and RK FSK RK
Distr Mean
(St.Dev)
Mode
(St.Dev)
Mean 10% 90% Mode
(St.Dev)
Mean 10% 90%
z N 1:005
(0:001)
1:005
(0:001)
1:005 1:004 1:006 1:005
(0:001)
1:005 1:004 1:007
p N 1:009
(0:001)
1:009
(0:001)
1:009 1:007 1:010 1:009
(0:001)
1:009 1:007 1:011
rL N 1:005
(0:001)
1:005
(0:001)
1:005 1:003 1:007 1:005
(0:001)
1:005 1:003 1:007
H B 0:330
(0:050)
0:279
(0:044)
0:271 0:200 0:341 0:266
(0:042)
0:268 0:199 0:337
G B 0:200
(0:025)
0:245
(0:024)
0:241 0:203 0:280 0:244
(0:024)
0:242 0:203 0:281
 B 0:360
(0:015)
0:299
(0:011)
0:301 0:282 0:320 0:299
(0:011)
0:302 0:283 0:320
 B 0:025
(0:002)
0:030
(0:002)
0:030 0:027 0:034 0:030
(0:002)
0:030 0:027 0:034
 N 2:000
(0:200)
2:286
(0:152)
2:281 2:026 2:536 2:211
(0:148)
2:199 1:952 2:447
' N 0:500
(0:100)
0:286
(0:104)
0:318 0:153 0:482 0:342
(0:103)
0:332 0:151 0:496
 N 21:00
(10:00)
39:66
(7:647)
41:97 29:12 54:82 21:00
(10:02)
22:30 7:787 35:57
 N 3:000
(0:200)
3:609
(0:183)
3:594 3:292 3:896 3:614
(0:183)
3:606 3:303 3:916
p B 0:500
(0:100)
0:654
(0:036)
0:644 0:584 0:704 0:922
(0:013)
0:917 0:894 0:940
w B 0:500
(0:100)
0:719
(0:069)
0:726 0:618 0:834 0:751
(0:066)
0:748 0:648 0:854
w B 0:750
(0:100)
0:461
(0:102)
0:449 0:295 0:604 0:436
(0:098)
0:449 0:290 0:607
p B 0:750
(0:100)
0:780
(0:074)
0:763 0:644 0:882 0:757
(0:070)
0:748 0:638 0:870
 N 0:100
(0:050)
0:414
(0:063)
0:401 0:297 0:505 0:415
(0:063)
0:408 0:309 0:512
rL B 0:500
(0:100)
0:825
(0:042)
0:809 0:737 0:880 0:825
(0:042)
0:814 0:742 0:885
r B 0:600
(0:100)
0:468
(0:048)
0:479 0:410 0:547 0:484
(0:049)
0:496 0:420 0:567
 N 1:500
(0:100)
1:665
(0:072)
1:675 1:566 1:783 1:654
(0:071)
1:665 1:550 1:783
y N 0:200
(0:050)
0:674
(0:042)
0:654 0:610 0:697 0:681
(0:042)
0:658 0:621 0:695
27Detalied diagnostic results are provided in the technical appendix, available upon request from the authors.
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Table 2b - Priors and posterior distribution of shock processes
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
FSK and RK FSK RK
Distr Mean
(St.Dev)
Mode
(St.Dev)
Mean 10% 90% Mode
(St.Dev)
Mean 10% 90%
z N 0:000
(0:200)
0:152
(0:041)
0:151 0:082 0:221 0:201
(0:039)
0:200 0:135 0:264
 B 0:500
(0:100)
0:944
(0:014)
0:936 0:917 0:955 0:944
(0:015)
0:934 0:915 0:953
 B 0:500
(0:100)
0:888
(0:020)
0:890 0:858 0:921 0:885
(0:020)
0:886 0:855 0:918
 B 0:750
(0:100)
0:935
(0:010)
0:933 0:917 0:950 0:935
(0:010)
0:933 0:915 0:950
me B 0:750
(0:100)
0:977
(0:008)
0:976 0:964 0:988 0:978
(0:007)
0:977 0:965 0:989
 B 0:150
(0:050)
0:088
(0:035)
0:105 0:044 0:166 0:079
(0:032)
0:096 0:037 0:152
w B 0:150
(0:050)
0:120
(0:042)
0:128 0:061 0:195 0:115
(0:041)
0:125 0:059 0:190
 B 0:250
(0:100)
0:024
(0:012)
0:028 0:009 0:047 0:025
(0:012)
0:030 0:009 0:050
z;me B 0:500
(0:100)
0:416
(0:089)
0:434 0:291 0:576 0:415
(0:089)
0:421 0:281 0:568
z IG 0:010
(inf)
0:010
(0:001)
0:010 0:010 0:011 0:011
(0:001)
0:011 0:010 0:012
 IG 0:010
(2)
0:011
(0:002)
0:012 0:009 0:016 0:011
(0:002)
0:013 0:009 0:017
 IG 0:010
(2)
0:017
(0:002)
0:017 0:015 0:020 0:016
(0:002)
0:017 0:014 0:019
 IG 0:010
(2)
0:012
(0:001)
0:012 0:011 0:014 0:012
(0:001)
0:012 0:011 0:014
me IG 0:010
(2)
0:019
(0:003)
0:020 0:016 0:024 0:019
(0:003)
0:020 0:016 0:024
 IG 0:010
(2)
0:004
(0:000)
0:004 0:003 0:004 0:004
(0:000)
0:004 0:003 0:004
w IG 0:010
(2)
0:006
(0:000)
0:005 0:005 0:006 0:006
(0:000)
0:005 0:005 0:006
 IG 0:010
(2)
0:006
(0:000)
0:006 0:005 0:006 0:006
(0:000)
0:006 0:005 0:007
 IG 0:010
(2)
0:002
(0:000)
0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002
(0:000)
0:002 0:002 0:002
4.3.1 Posterior estimates
According to the estimated posterior mode and standard deviations, all the structural parame-
ter estimates are signicant at standard pseudo-t values, with the exception of the coe¢ cient
w . The nding of a small size of z, shows that Zt can be approximated by a random walk
with drift process. This implies that the impact and the long-run responses of productivity to
a technology shock are nearly the same, providing evidence in favor of a NK explanation of the
contractionary e¤ects of supply shocks. The absence of relevant technological di¤usion delays
rules out the possibility short-run drops in the use of inputs due to intertemporal substitution
e¤ects stimulated by expected improvements in productivity (Lindé, 2004).
The shocks a¤ecting preferences (t and t), the aggregate resources constraint ("
me
t ) and
capital adjustment costs (t) are highly persistent, while the remaining stationary disturbances
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denote a moderate degree of autocorrelation. In particular, the degree of autocorrelation of
the measurement error process for ination is very low, signalling that the economic model
accounts a major fraction of the ination persistence in the data. The exogenous innovations
are all signicant according to their standard errors and there are signals that the most
important shocks are those a¤ecting the exogenous components in umet , preferences and the
capital adjustment cost.
The steady state values for productivity growth (z), ination
 
p

and the interest rate
spread (rL) are estimated to be 0:48%, 0:88% and 0:5% on a quarterly basis. These values are
strictly in line with priors and sample information. The estimated mean values of the capital
share and capital depreciation coe¢ cients ( = 0:30 and  = 0:03, respectively) are instead
relatively distant from the corresponding priors.
The posterior mean estimates of the "deep" parameters are close to the corresponding
modal values and do not depart excessively from prior opinions. There are however some key
exceptions that we deem as particularly important for the scopes of our analysis. First, the
estimated price/wage Calvo parameters are higher than their prior mean values (p = 0:64,
w = 0:73). Second, even if the estimation of the demand elasticity parameter  is initialized
with a relatively high value ( = 21), we obtain an even higher posterior mean estimate for this
parameter, consistent with a 2:5% mark-up ( = 41). Third, despite the relatively low prior
mean value for the parameter indicating the response of the monetary authority to output
deviations from long-run growth (0:2), the posterior estimate is y = 0:65. Fourth, contrary
to the ndings of previous analyses (e.g. Smets andWouters, 2007), we obtain a relatively high
degree of indexation in price setting (p = 0:71), while conrming the moderate indexation of
wages.
These results drive the model over a parameter space for which the contractionary e¤ects
of positive supply shocks on investment are relevant and persistent. The reduced-form NKPC
slope coe¢ cient  implied by our estimates is 0:01, which denotes a particularly at curve28,
and monetary policy does not fully accommodate the shock, as implied by the size of the
policy response to output deviations from trend growth.
Our estimates signal that the high degree of ination inertia is mostly explained by the
presence of relevant strategic complementarity in price setting, i.e. by the high demand
elasticity estimate, while the frequency of price reoptimization implicit to the estimated Calvo
parameter (nearly three quarters) is basically in line with microeconometric evidence.
4.3.2 Model comparison
We now consider how the outcomes obtained with the rm-specic capital specication com-
pare with those obtained with the more standard rental capital model. Major di¤erences
are found with respect to the estimated price stickiness and demand elasticity parameters
(p = 0:91 and  = 22 respectively). The higher estimate for p in the rental capital speci-
cation balances the (missing) e¤ect of  on the slope of the NKPC. In fact, according to the
estimated parameterization, the reduced-form NKPC slope coe¢ cient is again 0:01, even if at
28By imposing the (standard) dogmatic prior  = 11, we obtain ^p = 0:8, which conrms the particularly at NKPC (the
reduced-form slope coe¢ cient  is in this case 0:009). By increasing the dogmatic prior to  = 21 we obtain ^p = 0:73, which
again implies k^ = 0:011.
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the cost of forcing the Calvo parameter to a value that is distant from available evidence on
the frequency of price reoptimization at the rm-level (Bils and Klenow, 2004).
Concerning the remaining parameters, the estimated RK vector is basically equal to FSK ,
suggesting that the estimated rm-specic and rental capital specications are similar. Should
we conclude that the models are empirically equivalent? The Laplace approximation of the
log likelihood is, for the rm-specic and the rental capital models, 6156:5 and 6139:1, thus
the Bayes factor is BFFSK;RK = e[logP (YT jMFSK) logP (YT jMRK)] > 102. According to Je¤reys
(1961) scale of evidence, this result signals that there is decisive evidence in support of the
rm-specic capital model.
4.3.3 Posterior impulse responses
Figure 3 shows the posterior impulse responses to a positive supply shock under rm-specic/rental
capital specications, and compares them with the impulse responses obtained under the prior
parametrization of the rm-specic capital model. Note that, under the prior, the technology
shock is expansionary even in the short run.
There are at least ve indications from posterior IRFs that merit to be highlighted. First,
the rm-specic and the rental capital specications display a similar dynamics, signalling
that results do not depend excessively on model and prior specications. Second, the invest-
ment response is negative in the short-term, and becomes positive after nearly seven periods
(when the demand constraint becomes less binding as more rms cut their prices). Third,
the response of hours is negative for nearly nine periods, indicating that both specications
are consistent with the well-known productivity-employment puzzle. Fourth, consumption,
output and real wage responses are standard: consumption increases because of the expected
permanent increase in productivity and output, driving the expansionary aggregate demand
response (output), while the real wage increases following the increase in productivity. Fifth,
the interest rate reduction signals that the degree of accommodation implied by the estimated
monetary policy rule is not enough to prevent a decrease in ination.
Figure3-Prior and posterior impulse responses to a productivity improvement
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Our model is thus able to reproduce the apparently puzzling evidence on the short-term
contractionary e¤ects of technology shocks on hours and investment addressed by BFK, and
to provide some indications on the underlying theoretical mechanisms that explain them.
4.3.4 A brief comparison with previous analyses
Our results decisively contrast those obtained by the recent literature on business cycles
developed within the DSGE approach. Here we briey highlight the di¤erences with respect
to the outcomes of two key literature contributions. Smets and Wouters (2006) estimate a NK-
DSGE model with nominal and real frictions characterized by a particularly exible dynamics,
obtaining good adaptability to sample data and out of sample performances. However, even
if they obtain a drop in hours following a positive technology shock, the impulse response of
investment implied by their estimates is positive even on impact. The basic reason for this
result is that Smets and Wouters (2006) assume that the monetary authority targets exible
price output, resulting in a particularly accommodative rule which prevents the short-term
contraction of investment after the productivity improvement. In other terms, the presence
of real and nominal frictions is not su¢ cient to counterbalance the expansionary e¤ects on
investment of the interest rate adjustment.
Altig et al. (2005) develop a rm-specic capital monetary model that can account for the
negative short-run response of investment to supply shocks even under a plausible parameter-
ization. However, from the empirical evaluation of their model, based on an impulse response
matching strategy, they are forced to rule out such a result, since their benchmark SVAR
signals a positive short-term response of inputs29. In our opinion, the evidence produced with
a matching estimator applied to a model with a particularly exible dynamics cannot be con-
sidered conclusive, since it does not provide additional evidence to that implied by the SVAR
impulse responses. This strategy simply forces the model calibration to a parameters space
for which the implied model dynamics is consistent with the SVAR-based impulse responses.
We deem our results as more reliable with respect to those obtainable from weakly identied
SVARs, that generally do not provide a satisfying representation of the nonstationary and co-
trending properties of the data, and are subject to relevant biases due to approximation
problems and small samples (Cooley and Dwyer, 1998; Chari et al., 2005; Erceg et al., 2005).
5 Conclusions
Our results both complement and depart from those obtained by the vast literature on the
contractionary e¤ects of technology shocks. On the one hand, by addressing the investment
response to permanent technology improvements, we obtain a conrmation of BFKs results,
providing additional support to the idea that standard exible price models cannot explain
the observed pro-cyclicality of productivity, investment and hours as driven by positive supply
shocks. On the other hand, we show that the interpretation based on nominal rigidities only
29From the calibration of their model, Altig et al. (2005) also obtain a counterfactual increase in ination after a neutral
technology shock, due to the particularly accommodative monetary policy response. The strong response of money growth is
needed in order to account for the general rise in economic activity obtained with the benchmark SVAR.
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is not supported by the data, since it would imply a degree of nominal stickiness contrasting
with the available evidence on the frequency of price optimization at the rm level.
The calibration experiments and the simulations based on posterior estimates show that the
negative investment response to supply shocks basically depends on the presence of relevant
demand constraints. These emerge not only because of a not fully accommodative monetary
policy, but also because of the nearly at NKPC characterizing the rm-specic capital model.
Our results also show that a rm-specic capital model specication is needed to obtain a
plausible estimate of the degree of nominal stickiness, signalling that the limited operation
of the price mechanism (i.e. the weak relation between the marginal cost and ination)
does not depend only on the frequency at which rms are allowed to change their prices.
The strategic complementarity in price setting emerging in the rm-specic capital model
introduces an additional source of price inertia in the model. It implies that, following a
positive productivity shock, reoptimizing rms are reluctant to cut their price since they
anticipate that price reductions eventually a¤ect marginal costs, due to increased demand
and output at the rm level. Our structural approach allows a direct estimate of the demand
elasticity parameter, and thus an empirical evaluation of the relevance of the role played by
strategic complementarity.
Clearly, aside from rm-specicity of capital, there are other theoretical hypotheses that can
induce strategic complementarity in price setting. Among these hypotheses, the rm-specic
labor and endogenous demand elasticity assumptions have been employed in the literature
(Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007). Our results should not be con-
sidered as evidence in favor of one of these options, but as evidence of a limited operation of
price and monetary policy transmission mechanisms. A theoretical and empirical evaluation
of the implications and of the relative importance of these alternative sources of real rigidity
is left for future research.
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